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Abstract
Why are unemployment expectations of the man in the street markedly diﬀerent
from professional forecasts? We present an agent-based model to explain this deep
disconnection using boundedly rational agents with diﬀerent levels of education. A
good ﬁt of empirical data is obtained under the assumptions that there is staggered
update of information, agents update episodically their estimate and there is a fraction
of households who always and stubbornly forecast that the unemployment is going to
raise.
The model also sheds light on the role of education and suggests that more edu-
cated agents update their information more often and less obstinately ﬁxate on the
worst possible forecast.
Keywords: Agent-based modeling; Bounded rationality; Unemployment ex-
pectations.
1 Introduction
Why are unemployment expectations of the man of the street so strikingly diﬀerent from
the ones produced by professional economists or highly regarded institutions? The question
is extremely important as the correct unemployment forecast is related to the quantiﬁcation
of the zero-income probability that was proven to be one of the most important drivers in
saving decisions (Carroll [6]).
We examine in this work survey data of Italian households and show that their forecasts
are only loosely related to or seemingly disconnected from professional estimates.1
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1By professional forecasts in this paper we refer to the ﬁgures made public by OECD every quarter.
The use of a speciﬁc set of professional forecasts is not aﬀecting the results sensibly as other forecasts,
say produced by diﬀerent research centers or governmental oﬃces, are typically very similar and strongly
correlated with the OECD data.
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The fact that standard agents produce a vastly diﬀerent set of forecasts when compared
with professional data demonstrates once more how the assumption of perfect rationality of
economic agents is ﬂawed even if it is still present in the majority of scholarly work. Indeed,
there is overwhelming evidence in experimental economics and psychology that shows the
limits of human rationality (Rabin [12]) and how poorly humans behave in problems that
involve complex situations (Camerer [4]). Realistic agents were shown to have troubles to
gather and correctly internalize a lot of information in a probabilistic setup that are likely
to be needed in the proper economic analysis of unemployment.
Clearly, it's also hard to believe that agents entirely fail to acquire information or are
unable to grasp even the most basic elements driving the risk of unemployment. In what
follows we assume that households are boundedly rational in the sense that their expecta-
tions are rational but based on wrong grounds due to their limited ability or willingness to
observe (and absorb!) relevant information. The idea is similar, for instance, to Axtell and
Epstein ([1]) where a handful of workers are rational in their retirement decisions whereas
most of the population just adopts herding strategies imitating the behavior of the peers
in the social network. Moro and Pellizzari [? ] study the labour market participation
where agents mimic (only) the ones with approximately the same age and health who ap-
pear to have higher satisfaction (or utility) from work and leisure. Our framework was
also inspired by the epidemiological metaphor used in Carroll [5], where the diﬀusion of
information is depicted in pretty much the same way in which epidemics spread: only some
agents are infected at time t by a common source (say, mass media coverage) and react
accordingly, whereas the ones that were not infected keep using the obsolete information
or act on the basis of spurious facts.
We assume that only the most informed fraction of the population acquires the relevant
knowledge and uses a professional forecast. The remaining portion behaves as (very) naive
econometricians (Branch [3]), projecting old trends into the future, or stubbornly and
pessimistically keeps saying that unemployment is always going to increase in the future.
Departing notably from previous work, we also include in the model the dependence
on the education of the agents, as it's likely that more (less) educated households are more
(less) likely to get informed and use professional forecasts. We calibrate the model to
empirical data ﬁtting, for each education level, the probability to obtain the professional
forecast as well as the probability to stubbornly declare that unemployment is going to
increase.
Interestingly, our results show that observed forecasts are quite similar to the ones pro-
duced by the model. In addition, more educated agents more often get and use professional
forecasts and less frequently exhibit stubborn pessimism. In this sense, our work shows a
plausible way to reconcile data with a realistic behavior of the agents (who are not perfectly
informed and fail to be fully rational at all times).
Our model is explicit, as suggested in Epstein [9], it is suﬃcient to replicate the most
salient features of the data and, even if we cannot claim it necessarily says the last word,
it sheds light on reasons accounting for diﬀerent forecasts. Our work is quite evidently
related to the generative' approach to modelling and oﬀers a tentative explanation as we
can grow the phenomenon of interest, see Epstein [8].
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data we have used and shows
how prima facie survey observations appear to be very weakly aligned with professional
forecasts. The agent-based model using education-dependent types is described in Section
3. We then present and discuss the results of a series of NetLogo simulations. Section 5
contains the conclusion and some ﬁnal remarks.
2 The data
In this paper we make use of data gathered by the Italian National Institute of Statis-
tics (ISTAT) on unemployment expectations. Speciﬁcally, ISTAT each month asks to a
randomly selected sample of 2000 households the following question:
How do you expect the number of people unemployed in Italy to change over
the next 12 months?
Users have the option to provide an answer in the set {increase sharply, increase slightly,
remain the same, decrease slightly, decrease sharply, don't know}. Answers are encoded
using the values {+2,+1, 0,−1,−2, 0}, respectively.
Data are aggregated forming the average of the answers and multiplying by 100, ef-
fectively weighting twice as much the sharp replies with respect to the slight ones.
Therefore, the balance2 index has a theoretical range going from -200, if 100% of intervie-
wees expect unemployment to decrease sharply in one year, to +200, if 100% of interviewees
expect unemployment to increase sharply in one year. Moreover, sub-indexes that provide
expectations for particular demographic categories are available. The comparison of the
sub-indexes is not a negligible topic, since several empirical works suggest that the degree
of ﬁnancial literacy (Lusardi and Mitchell [11]) and expectations (Souleles [13] and Easaw
et al. [? ]) are related to the demographic characteristics of the individual, with a relevant
role of the education level.
Professional forecasts are contained in the OECD Economic Outlook for Italy, which
is released on a biannual basis.3 In our analysis we use the forecasted change in the
unemployment rate, measured as the diﬀerence between the forecasted unemployment rate
in four quarters and the unemployment rate of the current quarter.
The top panel of Figure 1 represents the quarterly indexes for the three diﬀerent edu-
cation levels, namely Less than High School, High School, College. The plot shows that the
three series are correlated but have diﬀerent levels and that the range of values actually
attained by the indexes in the last 22 years ([−25, 115]) is quite narrow with respect to
the theoretical one ([−200, 200]). For example, the index for less educated households has
never attained negative values meaning that, in this 22 years window, they never expected
2A balance index is constructed as the diﬀerence between the percentages of respondents giving
positive and negative replies.
3From 2003, OECD releases forecasts also for each quarter, while for the period from 1995 to 2002
OECD releases forecasts only for each semester. Therefore until 2002 we estimate the missing quarters
forecasts through interpolation of the biannual forecasts.
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the unemployment rate to decrease. This is clearly not justiﬁed by neither OECD forecasts
(Figure 1, in the bottom panel) nor ex-post realizations, since the 90 quarters we consider
are split almost equally between periods of increasing and of decreasing unemployment,
and the average value of the change in the unemployment rate is close to zero. Hence, the
series of professionals' and households' forecasts have a strikingly diﬀerent interpretation.
Figure 1: Above: Households unemployment expectations balance indexes by education
level (1995Q1-2017Q2). Below: Forecasts of the one-year change in the unemployment
rate, as released by the OECD (1995Q1-2017Q2)
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Table 1: Summary statistics (1995Q1-2017Q2)
Min 1st Qu Median Mean 3rd Qu Max St.Dev
Less than High School 4.97 35.84 50.4 53.34 64.9 114 24.79
High School -9.6 24.89 39.73 44.27 58.32 113.7 28.35
College -23.47 15.77 32.7 39.09 54.32 109.5 32.39
Table 1 shows some descriptive statistics of ISTAT data. It is apparent that less edu-
cated individuals are more pessimistic (higher mean and median) and change less frequently
their opinion (lower standard deviation). This stylized evidence, implying that the knowl-
edge and use of relevant information (i.e., professional forecasts) diﬀers as a function of
the education level, will be incorporated in the model described in the next section.
3 The model
Assume there are N agents, whose education level is edui ∈ E = {lths, hs, col}, with the
strings denoting Less than High School, High School and College, respectively.4
At (the beginning of) time t all agents observe a signal sit deﬁned as:
sit =

ot with probability λi
si(t−1) with probability β(1− λi)
0 with probability (1− β)(1− λi)
, (1)
where ot is the latest professional forecast released by OECD, λi = λ(edui) is the probability
to obtain it and β is the probability to remember the past signal if one does not obtain
the latest professional forecast. In other words, at each time step agents can either get an
informative signal ot, with some probability that depends on their education, or remember
the old signal si(t−1) if they get no fresh news, or forget even the old signal. Observe
that, with probability β(1 − λi), the agent is not informed but keeps using the only item
of obsolete information he owned in the past. If, say, β = 0 then any uninformed agent
would pretend that unemployment will not change; at the other extreme, if β = 1, any
uninformed agent would remember and make use of the old signal.
Once the (informative or uninformative) signal is available, agents convert it into an
answer ansit to be reported in the survey. Recall from Section 2 that answers are encoded
with integers in {−2,−1, 0,+1,+2} to mean a range going from unemployment will de-
crease sharply (−2) through unemployment will remain the same (0) to unemployment
will increase sharply (+2). We assume that agents stubbornly report ansit = 2 with
probability µi = µ(edui); otherwise they translate their signal based on its perceived
4 2000 individuals are interviewed by ISTAT per month (6000 individuals per quarter). About 12 of
the Italian population belongs to the lths group, about 13 to the hs group and about
1
6 to the Col group.
Hence, the baseline simulation has 3000 agents per quarter with lths, 2000 with hs and 1000 with col.
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magnitude in the following way:
ansit =
{
+2 with probability µi
f(sit|γ) with probability 1− µi . (2)
The translation function f depends on a threshold γ > 0 that shapes 5 ranges of values
driving the interpretation of the signal:
f(sit|γ) =

+2 if sit ≥ γ;
+1 if γ/2 < sit < γ;
0 if −γ/2 ≤ sit ≤ γ/2;
−1 if −γ < sit < −γ/2;
−2 if sit ≤ −γ.
(3)
In words, while the signal is very large, i.e., exceeding γ, the agent will claim that unem-
ployment will increase sharply. If, instead, the signal is larger than γ/2 but smaller than
γ, the milder conclusion is that unemployment is going to increase slightly. Finally, if
the signal is close to zero, in the sense that −γ/2 ≤ sit ≤ γ/2, the answer will state that
the rate is not changing (and so on, with obvious modiﬁcations for negative values of the
signal sit).
At the end of period t, when all ansit, i = 1, ..., N, are available, it is straightforward
to compute the aggregate index according to the way used by ISTAT:
xt =
100
N
N∑
i=1
ansit.
Let yt denote the balance index and let y
lths
t , y
hs
t , y
col
t be the three subindexes relative
to the diﬀerent levels of education in E. Each run of the model produces a sequence
of computed expectations {xt, t = 1, ..., n} and indeed the code can be thought of as
an artiﬁcial data-generating process of surrogate data that can be compared with the
empirically observed expectations {yt, t = 1, ..., n}. The diﬀerences between the values of
xt and yt clearly depend on the values of the parameters β and γ, which are constant for all
agents, and of parameters λ and µ, which are heterogeneous and aﬀected by the education
level (lths, hs, col). If Θedu ∈ [0, 1]2 = (λedu, µedu) denotes the vector of the parameters
speciﬁc to education level edu ∈ E, we can calibrate the model minimizing the ﬁtting error
on the related subindex yedut .
There is a wide variety of possible and meaningful ﬁtting criteria and, in order to obtain
Θˆedu, we have used a very simple approach and have computationally minimized the sum
of the relative deviations of the ﬁrst two moments of the time-series xt (generated by the
model) and yedut (by ISTAT):
Θˆedu = arg min
Θedu
((
E[xt]− E[yedut ]
E[yedut ]
)2
+
(
V [xt]− V [yedut ]
V [yedut ]
)2)
, (4)
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where E[·] and V [·] are the usual mean and variance operators. A list and a brief description
of the symbols used in the model are included in Table 2.
It is worth stressing that the model describes a tale in which boundedly rational agents,
who seldom acquire and process the relevant data, generate a series of expectations that
can be reconnected to some extent with those very same data. Indeed the man in the
street, despite its failure to use professional analysis immediately, makes episodic use of the
data and resort to pessimistic forecasts from time to time, based on his level of education.
Table 2: List of symbols and acronyms
Symbol Description
edu Education level in the set E = {lths, hs, col}
ot Oﬃcial professional forecast by OECD
yt, y
edu
t ISTAT balance index and subindex relative to edu ∈ E
sit Signal received by agent i at time t
ansit Survey answer provided by agent i at t
f(sit) Translation function
β Probability of remembering the past signal
λedu Probability of absorbing the current oﬃcial forecast
µedu Fraction of stubbornly pessimistic households
γ Parameter determining the qualitative translation of the signal
Acronym Meaning
lths Less than High School
hs High School
col College
In a more abstract interpretation, the model is just a ﬁlter taking as an input the
OECD data and generating the ﬁltered data published by ISTAT. Even though purely
orthodox economists often expect the two sequences to be the same, this is clearly not
the case. The ﬁlter, embedding scattered update of information, eﬀects of education and
use of bleak forecasts, shows that the observed data can be realistically linked with the
professional estimates.
Next section will present the results obtained using the model with calibrated param-
eters.
4 Results
The model was implemented in NetLogo [14] a powerful and popular computational plat-
form to develop agent-base models in an object-oriented setup with plenty of graphical
facilities (download is free at http://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/).
Essentially, the user can change the parameters of the model and obtain a simulated
ISTAT time-series starting with the unique inputs provided by OECD every quarter. A
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screenshot of the model is visible in Figure 2.
Figure 2: A screenshot of the NetLogo model. Sliders can change the values of the param-
eters and the time series of the simulated data appear in the Plot window.
As a preliminary step, we calibrate the two parameters β and γ, which are common
among the three education groups, over a grid of possible values. The calibration was
obtained using NetLogo's BehaviorSpace, a tool allowing the eﬃcient generation of data
through the systematic exploration of the parameter space of the model and we picked
the values β = 0.9 and γ = 0.4. Suppose, for instance, that an agent equipped with his
individual µ receives the signal st = ot = 0.21 at time t: as the signal is bigger than γ/2 (but
smaller than γ), the answer will be anst = 1 with probability 1− µ or anst = 2 if he acts
stubbornly with probability µ. Assume next that the agent fails to get the OECD update
ot+1. Then, with probability β = 0.9 he remembers the past signal: si(t+1) = sit = 0.21, so
the answer will again be anst+1 = 1, or anst+1 = 2 if he acts stubbornly. Conversely, with
with probability 1− β = 0.1 he does not remember the past signal: in this case si(t+1) = 0
and the answer would be anst+1 = 0 (or anst+1 = 2 if he acts stubbornly).
Subsequently, we run separate calibrations for each education level, with the aim of
obtaining the values of λedu and µedu as described by (4). Table 3 displays the calibrated
parameters and illustrates how education inﬂuences the behavior of the agents. A look at
the ﬁrst column, reporting µ as a function of the education level, shows that the probability
to act stubbornly visibly declines for more educated households (for example agents with
a college degree have a µ about 20% smaller than their peers who did not complete the
high school).
As far as the probability to acquire information is concerned, the more (less) educated
agents more (less) often are infected by OECD data and the λ's are in the range 0.085
to 0.110 per quarter.5 Even though the ﬁgures may look quite close, the eﬀect is clearly
detectable over a yearly period: less than one third among the agents whose education is
5In the interpretation of the results, it has to be remembered that some of the individuals (on average,
a fraction λedu · µedu) receive the signal ot but still provide a stubbornly pessimistic answer. This implies
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Table 3: Calibrated values of µ, the probability to answer stubbornly, and λ, the probability
to acquire the current OECD forecast.
µ λ
LTHS 0.309 0.085
HS 0.270 0.095
College 0.251 0.110
lower than high school degree come to know professional forecasts over one year whereas
nearly 40% of agents equipped with a college degree acquire the information. Equivalently,
agents in the lths group are acquainted on average with the professional forecasts once in
three years, whereas the ones with a degree typically need approximately nine months less.
Table 4: Summary statistics - Simulated and Original (1995Q1-2017Q2)
Min 1st Qu Median Mean 3rd Qu Max St.Dev Cor
lths - Simulated 1.70 37.98 52.13 53.33 69.93 106.80 25.12 0.67
lths - Original 4.97 35.84 50.40 53.34 64.90 114.00 24.79
hs - Simulated -16.00 27.11 43.93 44.20 62.68 106.10 28.17 0.70
hs - Original -9.60 24.89 39.73 44.27 58.32 113.70 28.35
col - Simulated -24.60 19.94 39.90 39.49 59.46 108.00 31.90 0.73
col - Original -23.47 15.77 32.70 39.09 54.32 109.50 32.39
Table 4 contrasts the distributions of the simulated and original data. The mean and the
standard deviations are closely matched for any education level. Even more interestingly,
the simulated data closely reproduce the minima, maxima and quartiles of the observed
data. Diﬀerences are small and very rarely exceed 5 points (over a possible range of 400
points). The table also shows that the correlation between the real and the simulated
indexes xt and y
edu
t is about 70% and indeed turns out to be higher than the correlation
between the index and the raw series of professional forecasts yedut and ot.
Figure 3 provides a visual comparison of the original and simulated index. Conﬁrming
the interpretation of Table 4, the ﬁt is quite good especially in the ﬁrst decade of the XXI
century and, despite some misalignment around 2012, artiﬁcial data are reasonably close
to their empirical target.
5 Conclusion
Our research question revolved around the observation that unemployment forecasts pro-
duced by surveyed men in the street are vastly diﬀerent and, typically, stickier and
gloomier, than the ones produced and disseminated by professionals. This is clearly evident
that the fraction of individuals who receive the signal ot and really incorporate it into the answer ansit is
approximately λedu · (1− µedu), that is 0.059 for lths, 0.070 for hs and 0.083 for col.
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Figure 3: Households unemployment expectations balance (1995Q1-2017Q2)
contrasting the unemployment balance index provided by ISTAT with the data extracted
from the Economic Outlook by OECD, that was used in this work to proxy the professional
outcomes of rational experts and respected institutions.
We developed an agent-based model where the respondents to the survey are typiﬁed
by diﬀerent education, aﬀecting their willingness or ability to use the professional forecast
as well as the frequency with which they stubbornly claim that unemployment is likely to
raise. The acquisition of the professional signal and the way it is processed (or translated,
to use the terminology of Section 2) are both stochastic events driven by diﬀerent individual
parameters. ABMs are well known to allow for the possibility to exploit the interactions
of many boundedly rational agents who behave in a realistic way and are not required
to be perfectly informed and able to analyze complex economics problems. As Conlisk
[7] pointed out, rational choices can only be justiﬁed in some circumstances, say in the
presence of a simple context, when good feedback can be obtained and there are plenty
of opportunity to validate alternative decisions/estimates. The task of forecasting future
unemployment rate is indeed demanding, nuanced and plagued with structural uncertainty
and noise and, we believe, an ABM is a promising tool to reconcile the data with some
plausible description of agents' behavior.
The model shows that scattered update of information together with the frequent re-
course to over-pessimistic forecasts and oblivion are suﬃcient to accurately replicate the
empirical data.
The results tells a story in which only a minority of agents acquire (i.e., is infected
with) the public professional forecast and answer the survey accordingly. A much larger
proportion of households, for reasons that are not investigated in this work but may be
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related, say, to extreme risk aversion or lack of trust in the oﬃcial statistics, embrace the
most pessimistic view. Most of the agents, yet, give an intermediate and lazy answer based
on outdated information, whose eﬀect can last with dubious eﬀectiveness for several years.
Observe that such agents may emotionally feel in a comfortable herd, as they belong to
the majority of the population, see Baddeley [2].
One of the main novelty of our model is the introduction of education as a powerful
driver of heterogeneity in behavior and the intuition that the schooling level is extremely
relevant is a valuable insight of the model: more educated agents more often obtain and
use the professional forecasts and less often resort to the cheap answer that unemployment
will increase with no regard to the current economic situation. The relationship between
education and more rational behavior turns out to be monotone and extremely signiﬁcant
in our agent-based setup.
It would be interesting to explore in future research the alternative assumption that
there is peer-to-peer (local) information exchange (by contrast, in the present framework
there is a centralized and unique source for the rational forecast). The NetLogo code would
allow for similar computational generalizations that implement other strains of agents'
bounded rationality.
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